This paper develops an endogenous default risk model for small open economies that interact with risk averse international investors whose preferences exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA). By incorporating risk averse investors who trade with an emerging economy, the present model explains a larger proportion and volatility of the spread between sovereign bonds and riskless assets than the standard model with risk neutral investors. The paper shows that if investors have DARA preferences, then the emerging economy's default risk, capital flows, and bond prices are a function not only of the fundamentals of the economy but also of the level of financial wealth and risk aversion of international investors. In particular, as investors become wealthier or less risk averse, the emerging economy becomes less credit constrained. As a result, the emerging economy's default risk is lower, and its bond prices and capital inflows are higher. Additionally, with risk averse investors, the risk premium in the asset prices of the sovereign countries can be decomposed into two components: a base premium that compensates the investors for the probability of default and an "excess" premium that compensates them for taking the risk of default.
Introduction
In the literature on endogenous sovereign default risk, it is widely recognized that there is a strong relation between the domestic fundamentals of emerging economies and their access to international credit markets. 1 However, this literature has not considered (endogenously) the effect of investors' characteristics, such as their risk aversion and financial performance.
Empirically, investors' characteristics and sovereign bond prices are correlated: according to the empirical literature, investors' characteristics have the potential to affect the cost of external financing available for emerging economies as much as country specific fundamentals. 2 The current paper endogenizes this link. The purpose of the paper is to present a model that analyzes the importance of investors' characteristics in the determination of endogenous sovereign risk, interest rates, and capital inflows of emerging economies.
In reviewing the recent empirical literature on investors' characteristics and the determination of sovereign bond spreads and capital inflows to emerging economies, five stylized facts emerge which have not been accounted for by previous literature in endogenous sovereign risk:
(i) Emerging economies' estimated default probabilities do not account for all of the spreads in their sovereign bonds.
(ii) The risk premium (i.e. the part of the spread that is not accounted for by the expected losses from default) is higher for riskier countries, and it is larger for periods of crisis.
That this premium is larger in periods of turmoil implies that the risk premium is counter-cyclical.
(iii) Investors' financial performance and their net foreign asset position in emerging economies are positively correlated. Additionally, investors' financial performance and emerging economies' sovereign spreads are negatively correlated.
(iv) Emerging economies' credit spreads are positively correlated with spreads of corporate junk bonds from developed countries, which in the empirical literature are used as a proxy for investors attitude towards risk (referred to also as global risk aversion).
(v) Sovereign bond spreads across emerging economies' are highly correlated. 1 See for example Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) , Arellano (2008) , Hatchondo, Martinez and Sapriza (2008) , Cuadra and Sapriza(2008) , Mendoza and Yue (2011) , and Bai and Zhang (2012). 1 These stylized facts have not been accounted for by previous models in endogenous sovereign risk because they are not qualitatively consistent -and therefore cannot be quantitatively consistent -with models of endogenous default risk that have risk neutral investors.
If international investors in emerging economies are risk neutral, the spreads of the bonds of those economies should be explained only by the expected losses from default (i.e., by the default probabilities of the countries). In such case there is no additional risk premium. This situation is clearly inconsistent with stylized facts (i) and (ii).
Having risk neutral investors is also inconsistent with facts (iii) to (v): In models with risk neutral investors, emerging economies' default probabilities are determined by the economies' fundamentals and/or the beliefs of the investors regarding the default/repayment decision of the government given those fundamentals 3 . As a consequence, in those models neither investors' wealth nor risk appetite matter for the determination of the spreads and the capital inflows to the emerging economies, and they cannot be consistent with facts (iii) to (iv). Furthermore, in models with risk neutral investors, there cannot be an endogenous link between different emerging economies that allows their spreads to be highly correlated since investors' portfolio allocations to different countries depend only on the country specific risk assessment.
The current paper presents an alternative model of endogenous sovereign default risk that is qualitatively consistent with the previous cited facts, and that can account quantitatively for facts (i) through (iii). 4 This model departs from the previous literature by considering international investors that are risk averse and whose preferences exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA). 5 3 See Cole and Kehoe (2000) for a model of endogenous default risk with risk neutral investors where fundamentals of the economy can be relatively sound and default still might occur 4 Quantitatively, the model cannot account for fact (iv) since in the model investors' risk aversion does not fluctuate. The model cannot account fact (v) quantatively because only one emerging economy is considered here. Lizarazo (2012) extends the model here to the case of multiple emerging economies in order to study this case. in doing so, Lizarazo (2012) can quantitatively account for the high correlation across sovereign spreads of emerging economies that have financial links. 5 The assumption of DARA preferences seems to be justified by the characteristics of the investors in emerging financial markets. These investors are both individuals and institutional investors such as banks, mutual funds, hedge funds, pension funds and insurance companies. For individual investors, it is straightforward to assume that these agents are risk averse. For institutional investors risk aversion may follow from two sources: regulations over the composition of their portfolio and the characteristics of the institutions' management. Regarding the first source, banks face capital adequacy ratios; mutual funds face restrictions in their access to leverage against their asset holdings; and pension funds and insurance companies face strict limits on their exposure to risk. Regarding the second source, for each class of institutional investor, managers ultimately make the portfolio allocation decisions. These managers can also be treated as risk averse Because of this specification for investors' preferences, they demand an excess risk premium in order to willingly take the risk of default embodied in the emerging economies' sovereign bonds and this risk premium is higher for higher levels of risk. Additionally, since investors' preferences exhibit DARA, their tolerance of risk varies with their wealth and their degree of risk aversion. Therefore, this model is qualitatively consistent with the previously cited facts (i) to (iv), and if extended to a set up with more than one emerging economy, it is also consistent with fact (v). 6 In the quantitative part of the paper, the model is calibrated to the case of the default in 2001 in Argentina and its results are compared to the results of a similar model of endogenous sovereign default risk with risk neutral investors. In general, the model with risk averse investors performs better at explaining the real business statistics in Argentina.
The current model explains the spreads of the economy much better than its counterpart because it delivers higher average spreads with a higher volatility which is closer to the observed data. Also the model delivers the observed correlation between investors' wealth (proxied by the SP 500, as in the empirical literature) and the spreads of the economy. Like the risk-neutral model, the risk-averse model can also account for the negative correlations between output and trade balance, and output and interest rates; and both models account for the positive correlation between interest rates and trade balance. On the downside, neither model delivers sufficiently high average levels of debt.
The fact that the model with risk averse investors explains the spreads of the economy better than its counterpart implies that the model is able to account quantitatively for facts (i) and (ii): Approximately 21.62% of the average spread is due to the risk premium if the constant relative risk aversion parameter for the investors has a value of 2, and 34.14% of this spread is due to the risk premium if the constant relative risk aversion parameter for the investors has a value of 5. 7 During turbulent times spreads are explained to a larger extent by risk premium: Approximately 24.0% of the spread during the year before default is due to the risk premium if the constant relative risk aversion parameter for the investors has a value of 2, and 56.9% of this spread is due to the risk premium if the constant relative risk aversion parameter for the investors has a value of 5. These risk premiums during the year agents. Additionally, the remuneration-and therefore the wealth-of these agents is closely related to the performance of the portfolio that they manage. These factors suggest that portfolio choices of institutional investors will be consistent with the choices of agents whose preferences exhibit DARA. 6 As previously noted, Lizarazo(2012) develops such a model. 7 Since the average default probability of the model is very close for the model with risk neutral and risk averse investors, and since the total spread for risk neutral investors is explained by expected losses, the risk premium in the models with risk averse investors can be proxied by the excess spreads in those models in comparison to the spreads in the risk neutral model.
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previous to default are 2.38% and 22.76% more than the mean risk premiums for the models with risk aversion of 2 and 5 respectively. In other words, the sovereign risk premium is counter-cyclical. This result corresponds to fact (ii). Since for sufficiently large levels of investors' risk aversion, the model exhibits the observed negative correlation between proxies of investors wealth and sovereign spreads, the model can account quantitatively for fact (iii).
The paper is organized as follows: section 1 is the introduction; section 2 presents the theoretical model; section 3 derives some predictions of the model and discusses the relevant empirical literature that supports them; section 4 discusses the quantitative implications of the model; and section 5 concludes. Two appendixes provide proofs of propositions presented in the main text and the algorithm that solves the model.
THE MODEL

The Emerging Economy
There is a small open economy that is populated by identical risk averse households that maximize their discounted expected lifetime utility from consumption
where 0 < β < q f < 1 is the discount factor and c is the households' consumption at time t. 8 The households' periodic utility takes the functional form
where γ > 0 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
In each period, the households receive a stochastic stream of consumption goods, y.
This income is non-storable, its realizations are assumed to have a compact support, and the stream of income follows a Markov process drawn from probability space (y, Y (y)) with a transition function f (y ′ | y). Households also receive a lump-sum transfer from the government.
The government of the economy is a benevolent government that aims to maximize the lifetime utility of the households in the economy. The government has access to international financial markets in which it trades one-period non-contingent bonds with a representative competitive risk averse international investor. The government uses this access to financial markets to smooth the consumption path of the households in the economy.
In international financial markets the government borrows or saves by buying one period bonds, b ′ , at price q(b ′ , y, W ). Both the investors and the government of the economy take as given the price function of the emerging economy's non-contingent discount bonds, q(b ′ , y, W ). In each period, the government rebates back to the households all proceeds from its international credit operations in a lump-sum fashion.
Bonds of the emerging economy, b ′ , are risky assets because debt contracts between the government of the emerging economy and the investors are not enforceable. At any time, the government of emerging economy can choose to default on its debt. If the government defaults, all its current debt is erased, and it is temporarily excluded from international financial markets. Defaulting also entails a direct output cost.
Because the investors are risk averse, the bond prices of the emerging economy q(b ′ , y, W ) have two components: the price of the expected losses from default q RN (δ(b ′ , y, W )) that corresponds to the price of riskless bonds (hereafter T-Bills), q f , adjusted by the default probability of the economy δ(b ′ , y, W ) ,and an "excess" premium or risk premium ζ RA (b ′ , y, W ).
This result will be discussed in more detail in the next sub-section.
Obviously when b ′ ≥ 0, the probability of default, δ(b ′ , y, W ), is 0, and since the asset is riskless in this case, the risk premium, ζ RA (b ′ , y, W ), is also 0. Therefore the price of the bond of the emerging economy is equal to the price of T-Bills which is q f = 1 1+r , where r is the constant international interest rate. Only when b ′ ≤ 0 can δ(b ′ , y, W ) and ζ RA (b ′ , y, W ) be different from 0.
When the government chooses to repay its debts, the resource constraint of the emerging economy is given by
When the government chooses to default the resource constraint of the emerging econ-5 omy is given by
where y def = h(y) and h(y) is an increasing function.
The timing of decisions within each period on the side of the emerging economy is as follows: the government starts with initial assets b, observes the income shock y, and decides whether to repay its debt or to default. If the government decides to repay, then taking as given the bond price schedule q(b ′ , y, W ), the government chooses its next period asset position b ′ subject to the resource constraint. On the other hand, when the government decides to default, all its assets holdings and debts are erased, and the government is excluded from access to credit markets. Finally consumption of the emerging economies' households, c, takes place.
Define V 0 (b, y, W ) as the value function of the government that has the option to default. The government starts the current period with assets b and income y and faces the representative international investor that has wealth W . The government decides wether to default or repay its debts to maximize the households' welfare. Given the option of default,
where V R (b, y, W ) is the value to the government of repaying its debt and V D (b, y, W ) is the value of defaulting in the current period. In this model the value of defaulting in the current period is a function not only of y, but also of b, and W , since if the government defaults the investors face an asset loss of −b and their actual wealth corresponds to W + b. 9
If the government defaults the value of default is given by
It is important to comment that the fact that V D is a function of b does not imply that the government internalizes its effect on the value of W ′ , and as consequence in the value of V D (b, y, W ): Since default in the model is not partial (the government either defaults in all its debt or does not default at all), if the government defaults in the current period W ′ is exogenous; it only depends on exogenous variables like the actual realized value of the investors wealth ϑ T B = W + b, the exogenous probability for the economy of re-entering credit markets, and the current level of the economy's income y and its stochastic process. Therefore, from the point of view of the government, given the state of the world today (that includes b, and W , or in other words includes b, and ϑ T B ) the value of its outside option, V D (b, y, W ), is completely exogenous.
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where θ is the probability that the economy regains access to credit markets.
If the government repays its debts, the value of not defaulting is given by
Let s = {b, y, W } be the aggregate state of the model. For the government of the emerging country, the decision of default/repayment depends on the comparison between the value of repaying its debt, V R (s) , versus the value of opting for financial autarky, V D (s). The repayment/default decision of the government is summarized by the indicator variable d. In the context of this model, when the government pays back its debt this variable takes the value of 1 and when the government does not pay back this variable has the value of 0. The functional form of the default/repayment decision is given by
This repayment/default decision is a period-by-period decision.
It is also important to note that the government faces a lower bound on debt B < 0 that prevents Ponzi schemes. This lower bound on debt B is not binding in equilibrium
Following closely Arellano (2008) , and conditional on the representative investor's wealth level W , the emerging economy's default policy can be characterized by repayment and default sets:
Definition 1 For a given level of wealth, W , the default set D (b | W ) consists of the equilibrium set of y for which default is optimal when the government's asset holdings are b:
The repayment set A (b | W ) is the complement of the default set and corresponds to the equilibrium set of y for which repayment is optimal when the government's asset holdings are b:
Equilibrium default sets, D (b ′ | W ′ (s)), are related to equilibrium default probabilities, δ (b ′ , s), by the equation
If the default set is empty for b ′ , then for all realizations of the economy's endowment d ′ = 1, and the equilibrium default probability δ (b ′ , s) is equal to 0. In this case, it is not optimal for the government to default in the next period for any realization of the economy's endowment. On the other hand, if the default set for b ′ includes the entire support for the endowment realizations, i.e. D (b ′ | W ′ (s)) = Y , then d ′ = 0 for all realizations of the economy's endowment. As a consequence, the equilibrium default probability δ (b ′ , s) is equal to 1. Otherwise, when the default set is not empty but does not include the whole support for the endowment realizations, 0 < δ (b ′ , s) < 1.
Associated with the default sets we can define two concepts, the maximum credit constraint and the maximum safe level of debt:
The maximum credit constraint is the maximum level of assets, b(W ), that is low enough such that no matter what the realization of the endowment, default is the
Definition 3
The maximum safe level of debt is the minimum level of assets b(W ) for which repayment is the optimal choice for all realizations of the endowment. In this case,
Because the value of repayment is monotonically decreasing in b, it is obvious that b(W ) ≤b(W ) ≤ 0. b(W ) and b(W ) are single-valued functions. 10 Given W ′ , any investment in the emerging economy's bonds in excess of b(W ′ ) would imply δ(b ′ , s) = 1. Since the default likelihood is one of the components of the prices of the bonds of the economy, these investments will have a q(b ′ , s) = 0. On the other hand, all investments in the emerging economy's bond of an amount lower than b(W ′ ) imply δ(b ′ , s) = 0. Because these investments are riskless it follows that q(b ′ , s) = q f . 10 The stochastic process for the endowments has a compact support, and conditional on W , the value of the credit contract is monotonically decreasing in b. Monotonicity of the credit contract and compactness of the endowment support are sufficient conditions to guarantee that b(W ) and b(W ) are single-valued functions.
In this case, conditional on investors' wealth W , the main results of comparative statics of the model of endogenous sovereign risk with risk neutral international investors follow.
(See Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) Arellano(2008) .) That is, default sets are shrinking in the
Also, the emerging economy only defaults when it is facing
. Finally, conditional on the persistence of the endowment process not being too high, the default risk is larger for lower levels of income.
Since the economic intuition of these results is identical to the intuition in the model of endogenous sovereign default risk with risk neutral investors, it will not be discussed in detail here.
is also decreasing in b ′ . Therefore bond prices q(b ′ , s) are, as in the model with risk neutral investors, increasing in b ′ . This result will be discussed in more detail in the next sub-section.
International investors
There are a large but finite number of identical competitive investors who will be represented by a representative investor. The representative investor is a risk averse agent whose preferences over consumption are defined by a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) periodic utility function with parameter γ L > 0. The investor has perfect information regarding the income process of the emerging economy, and in each period the investor is able to observe the realizations of this endowment.
The representative investor maximizes her discounted expected lifetime utility from
where 0 < β L < q f < 1 is the discount factor of the investor and c L is the investor's consumption. The periodic utility of this agent is given by
The representative investor is endowed with some initial wealth, W 0 , at time 0, and in each period, the investor receives an exogenous income X.
Because the representative investor is able to commit to honor her debt, she can borrow 9 or lend from industrialized countries (which are not explicitly modeled here) by buying T-Bills at the deterministic risk free world price of q f . The representative investor can also invest in non-contingent bonds of the emerging economy which have an endogenously determined stochastic price of q. As was mentioned before, this price is taken as given by the investors.
The timing of decisions within each period on the side of the investors is as follows: The Whenever the government of the emerging economy has payed back its debt the representative investor faces the budget constraint
It is assumed that investors cannot go short in their investments with emerging economies. Therefore whenever the emerging economy is saving, the representative international investor receives these savings and invests them completely in ϑ T B ′ . Therefore
the economy is borrowing, and it is equal to 0 otherwise. 11 On the other hand, if the government of the economy is in financial autarky because of default in the current period or past default without yet regaining access to credit markets, the investor's budget constraint is
This assumption does not seem to be inconsistent with reality. For example, mutual funds are strictly restricted by The Investment Company Act in their ability to leverage or borrow against the value of securities in their portfolio. On the other hand, hedge funds and other types of investors face no such restrictions. Because of these regulations it seems reasonable to make the simplifying assumption that international investors are able to leverage the riskless asset, ϑ T B , but must have a non-negative position in the emerging economy's asset.
The law of motion of the representative investor's wealth is given by
where d ′ is defined as in the emerging economy's sub-section.
Define V 0 L (s) as the value function of the representative investor with an asset position of W facing a government with assets b and income y at the start of the period, which might default.
where V R L (s) is the value to the investors when the government repays its debt, and V D L (s) is the value to the investors when the government defaults in the current period. As said before, if the government repays its debt the investors wealth is W otherwise they face an asset loss of −b and their actual wealth corresponds to ϑ T B .
If the government of the emerging economy defaults, the value of default to the investors is given by
If the government repays its debts the value to the investors is given by
The representative investor faces a lower bound on her asset holdings W < 0 that prevents Ponzi schemes,
W corresponds to the "natural" debt limit discussed in Aiyagari (1994) . Additionally, the investor's asset position in bonds of the emerging economy is non-negative, i.e. ϑ ≥ 0.
The optimization problem that the representative investor faces can be described as one in which in each period, t, she optimally chooses her portfolio according to her preferences in order to maximize her discounted expected lifetime utility from consumption, subject to her budget constraint, the law of motion of her wealth, the no-ponzi condition, and the condition that ϑ ≥ 0.
Because v(c L ) satisfies the standard Inada conditions, and X is sufficiently large, c L > 0 always. Because the representative investor is not credit constrained (Equation (15)), when the government does not default in the current period, the solution to the stochastic dynamic problem for this investor can be characterized by the following first order conditions:
For
On the other hand, when the government of the emerging economy is in financial autarky, the solution to the stochastic problem of the investor is characterized by the following first order condition
Equation (17) It is possible to manipulate equation (17) to get
where
. Equation (19) shows the two components of the bond prices of economies that trade financially with risk averse investors. The first component, q RN , compensates the investors for the expected loss from default. The second component, ζ RA , corresponds to the risk premium that sovereign bonds have to carry in order to induce risk averse investors to hold them. This term is the principal source of the differences between the results of this model and the model of endogenous sovereign risk with risk neutral investors.
The main determinant of the risk premium ζ RA is the covariance term in equation (19).
This risk premium is different from 0 only when the covariance term is different from 0.
In turn, this covariance term is non-zero only for bonds with face value b ′ such that the government of the emerging economy finds it optimal to default on its debt next period in some, but not all, states of the world, that is for bonds, b ′ , for which 0 < δ < 1. For these bonds, the covariance term is non-positive: Leaving aside the behavior of ζ RA , it is important to note that for any bond with face 12 If for some bond b ′ the government of the economy does not default next period in any state of the world 
value b ′ , the probability of default is higher in the case of a risk averse investor, δ(b ′ , s), than in the case of a risk neutral investor, δ RN (b ′ , s). 13 Therefore, for any bond b ′ , the component of the price that compensates the investor for the expected loss from default is also larger in the case of risk averse investors. In conclusion, for s and b ′ given, for the emerging economy trading with a risk averse investor, the price of the bonds, q (δ (s, b ′ )), is always lower or at best equal to price of the same bonds traded with a representative risk
From Equation (19), it is clear that if investors are risk averse, q(b ′ , s) depends not only on the emerging economy's fundamentals (i.e. y and b ′ ), but on γ L and W . In contrast, in models of emerging economies that face risk neutral investors, the bond price of the economy depends only on the economy's own fundamentals (i.e, q(b ′ , y)). 
Investor's Credit Constraints
Whenever the representative investor faces credit constraints in international credit markets then the following Kuhn-Tucker conditions characterize her optimization problem: 
where q * corresponds to the bond price consistent with an interior solution for the representative investor's optimization problem, and µ corresponds to the multiplier on the representative investor's credit constraint.
Given that credit constraints for the investors increase their opportunity cost of investing in emerging economies, other things equal, these constraints should reduce the equilibrium bond prices of the emerging economy even further in comparison to the default risk adjusted price (i.e. q RN ).
Recursive Equilibrium
The recursive equilibrium for this model is defined as a set of policy functions for (i) 
This condition implies that the representative investor and the representative agent of the emerging economy agree on a financial contract (b ′ , q) that is optimal for both agents.
Default Risk and Investor's Characteristics
This section focuses on the role that investor's characteristics-wealth and risk aversionhave on emerging economies' access to credit. This section derives the implications (results) of the model for the role of these characteristics in the determination of sovereign bond prices, default probabilities, and debt flows of the emerging economies. Finally, the model results are discussed in the context of the relevant empirical literature. 16 
Default Sets and Risk Aversion of International Investors
Proposition 1 For any state of the world, s, as the risk aversion of the international investor increases, the probability that the government defaults increases.
Proof. See Appendix.
In this model, the more risk averse are international investors, the higher is the default risk of the emerging economy and the tighter is the emerging economy's endogenous credit. The economic intuition behind this result is straightforward: To induce a very risk averse investor to hold sovereign bonds, the government has to accept a very low price for this bonds. However, other things equal, with lower bond prices incentives to default are stronger. Therefore, for any given state of the world, δ(b ′ , s) is increasing in γ L .
As δ(b ′ , s) changes, so too will the capital flows to the economy: For
The maximum credit constraints for the government, b (W ), are tighter when international investors are more risk averse-some contracts that are feasible with less risk averse investors are not feasible with more risk averse investors.
Default Sets and Investors' Wealth
Proposition 2 Default sets are shrinking in assets of the representative investor. For all W 1 < W 2 , if default is optimal for b in some states y, given W 2 , then default will be optimal for b for the same states y, given
The investor's wealth also affects the emerging economy's performance. The intuition for this result is simple: given some δ(b ′ , s), it is less costly in terms of current utility for the investor to invest in the emerging economy when she is wealthy than when she is poor.
So keeping constant the degree of risk that the investor faces, any investment that she is willing to undertake when she is poor she will also be willing to undertake when she is rich.
Intuitively, financial contracts available to the government of the emerging economy when the investor is relatively rich have to be at least as good as the feasible contracts to which the government has access when the investor is relatively poor. Additionally, the previous effect implies that the government of the economy faces stronger incentives to default when the wealth of the investor is relatively low. Therefore δ(b ′ , s) is decreasing in the wealth of the investor. These two effects amplify and reinforce each other. That δ(b ′ , s) is decreasing in W implies that the economy's bond prices q(b ′ , s) are increasing in W .
Proposition 2 also implies that for
In other words, the maximum credit limit that the government faces is tighter for lower levels of wealth of the investor (b (W 1 ) ≥ b (W 2 ))-some portfolio investments that are feasible when the investor is wealthy cannot be an equilibrium outcome when the investor is poor.
Default as an equilibrium outcome of the model and Investors characteristics
In the current model, in order to observe default it is necessary to have
for which by increasing its borrowing beyond b (W ′ (s)), the government is able to increase Conditional on the investor's wealth, W , y * (b|W ) divides the space {y, b} into the default and repayment regions. From the previous discussion of the model, it is possible to establish that y * (b|W ) is decreasing in the government's assets,b, and the investor's assets, W , and increasing in the investor's risk aversion, γ L . Using y * (b|W ), the equilibrium bond price function, q(b ′ , s), can be written as:
where F is the cumulative probability distribution of shocks.
Clearly since y * (b ′ |W ′ (s)) is decreasing in b ′ , and ζ(b ′ , s) is increasing in b ′ , as debt increases, q(s, b ′ | W ′ (s)) goes to zero. We define the endogenous borrowing limit b * (s | W ′ )
as follows:
For any state s, b * (s | W ′ ) is the endogenous borrowing limit because conditional on W ′ , Investors' characteristics contribute to a non-empty risky region in two ways which have opposite effects: First, from proposition 1, proposition 2, and equation (21), the speed at which q(b ′ , s) decreases when b ′ decreases is increasing in γ L and decreasing W . This effect implies that default is less likely to be observed at equilibrium for economies trading with international investors that are more risk averse or less wealthy.
Second, for smaller b (W ′ (s)), there is a higher chance that there exists b * (s) < b (W ′ (s)). Intuitively, because investors must be compensated in order to induce them to take some default risk, this risk imposes an additional cost of borrowing for the government of the economy. For the borrower, the cost of borrowing beyond b (W ′ (s)) must be paid over the total amount of resources borrowed, and not only over the marginal amount of borrowing. Therefore, the larger is the base over which this additional cost of borrowing has to be paid-i.e. the larger is b (W ′ (s))-the higher is the cost of default risk and the lower is the likelihood that the government would ever choose to borrow beyond b (W ′ (s)).
As stated before, because of proposition 1 and proposition 2 b (W ′ (s)) is decreasing in γ L and increasing in W . This effect implies that default is more likely to de observed at equilibrium for economies trading with international investors that are more risk averse or less wealthy. Risk Premium In the model, the risk premium is more important for higher riskiness of the economy's bonds. This result is consistent with the empirical evidence documented by Cantor and Pecker (1996) these authors establish that sovereign bond spreads across emerging economies are highly correlated. This result is stylized fact 5. 16 4 Quantitative Analysis
Because
Comparison of the Model with Empirical Evidence
The model in this paper is used to study the Argentina debt crisis and default at the end of 2001. In order to highlight the specific contribution of risk aversion to the endogenous sovereign debt literature, in this section the risk averse model will be compared to an otherwise similar model with risk neutral investors. In this manner, the quantitative performance of the current model will be directly comparable with the case of risk neutral investors. 16 Regarding contagion across emerging economies sovereign markets, there is a large body of empirical literature that presents evidence that financial links play a significant role in explaining simultaneous financial crises and correlated spreads across emerging economies. See, for example, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998) Table 1 gives the parameters which are considered in the numerical analysis of the model.
Calibration
To make the comparison straightforward between the results of this model and the model with risk neutral investors, most of the parameters for the emerging economy are taken from the calibration in Arellano (2008) . The mean income of the emerging economy is normalized to 1; the coefficient of risk aversion of the economy is 2, a standard value considered in the business cycle literature; the free interest rate is set to 1.7%, to match the period under study with the quarterly US interest rate of a bond with a maturity of 5 years; GDP is assumed to follow a log-normal AR(1) process log(y t ) = ρlog(y t−1 ) + ε y with E[ε y ] = 0 and E[ε y 2 ] = σ 2 y . The values estimated by Arellano(2008) for the Argentinean economy are ρ = 0.94 and σ y = 0.025, and the shock is discretized into a 21 state Markov chain. The probability of re-entry to credit markets after defaulting is set at 0.282, the value chosen in Arellano (2008) . 18 The model with risk neutral investors targets a volatility of 1.75 for the trade balance. The discount factor is set at 0.953 which in the model with risk neutral investors targets an annual default probability of 3%. Following a default there is an asymmetrical function for the output loss that follows:
y is the only parameter of the economy that is not taken directly from Arellano (2008) . Following the strategy in Arellano (2008) , y is calibrated to target a value of 5.53% for the average debt service to GDP. 19 The parameters for the international investors are set as follows: the representative investor's discount factor is set to 0.98. The value of β L = 0.98 is one in the range commonly used in business cycle studies of industrialized countries such that the asset distribution of the investors is well defined given an international interest rate of 1.7%. It should be noted that the results in this paper are not very sensitive to the choice of β L if this choice is in the range of commonly used values in the real business literature.
The representative investor's coefficient of risk aversion takes five different values: 0, The representative investor receives a deterministic income of X = 1% of the emerging economy's mean income in each period. This parameter is included to preclude the investors from not investing in the emerging economy in order to avoid a negative consumption level in the case of default by the government of the economy. Potentially this parameter could have important effects on the results of the model because it determines the borrowing limit that international investors face in international credit markets. 20, 21 Therefore, the strategy for choosing X is to give it as little importance as possible by choosing a value that is close to 0 and that still allows for interior solutions regarding the investors' investments in the emerging economy's bonds. Overall, the numerical analysis of the model shows that as long as X is not too large (i.e. X < 100% of the emerging economy's average income)
the results of the model are not very sensitive to the value of X.
Simulations
The model is simulated for 20, 000 periods. From these 20, 000 periods, sub-samples that have the economy staying in the credit market for 74 periods before going into a default are taken to compute the economy's business cycles statistics. This process is repeated 5, 000 times, and the cycle statistics are the average of the statistics derived from each of these repetitions.
The results of the simulations are shown in Table 2 . For any variable x, the label x refers to the results of the simulations for the seventy-four periods previous to the default episode; the label x − 4 refers to the results of the simulations for the four periods previous to the default episode; x − D refers to the results of the simulations for the period previous to the default episode.
As can be seen in Table 2 , the proportion of the spreads of the economy and the volatility of these spreads that can be explained by the model of endogenous sovereign default risk 20 The natural debt limit faced by the investors defined in equation (15) is given by W = −X(1+r f ) r f . 21 When X is large the portfolio choice of the investors is not very sensitive to W and γ L , and the results of the model tends to the results of the model with risk neutral investors. By affecting the leverage ability and the availability of resources on the side of the investors, X plays a fundamental role in determining the willingness to take risk by these agents. is increasing in γ L . In the data, the mean interest rate spread is 12.67%. According to the model, for the whole period, if γ L = 0 the mean interest rate spread is only 4.65%, but if γ L = 2 the mean interest rate spread increases to 5.93%, and if γ L = 5 the mean interest rate spread is 7.06%. For the year previous to default, the mean interest rate spread in the data is 22.26%. According to the model, if γ L = 0 the mean interest rate spread is 7.13%, but if γ L = 2 the mean interest rate spread increases to 9.38%, and if γ L = 5 the mean interest rate spread is 16.54%. Also, for the period before default, in the data the spread rises to 29.93%. The model predicts a spread for the period before default of 11.45% if γ L = 0, a spread of 11.49% if γ L = 2, and a spread of 29.66% if γ L = 5. 22
The model is also more successful than its risk neutral counterpart at explaining the volatility of spreads: The volatility of the spread in the data is 5.42%; for high values of 22 In simulating the risk neutral solution, the model in this paper finds a higher δ and a lower r − r f for the period before the default episode than those found for the same calibration in Arellano (2008) . This difference is likely the result of using a different solution method and a different dimension for the economy's asset position. As discussed in Hatchondo and Martinez (2006) , models of endogenous sovereign risk are sensitive to the solution method employed and how sparse is the grid for the asset position of the economy. 
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The model introduced here also reproduces the counter-cyclical behavior of domestic interest rates. However, independently of the value of γ L , the value of the correlation predicted by the models here is lower than the observed value for the data of −0.60 for the whole period and −0.90 for the year before default: If γ L = 2, the numerical solution of the model shows that the correlation between domestic interest rates and output is around −0.28 for the whole period and −0. Instead this issue might be overcome by considering long term debt, domestic financial institution's and domestic firms' borrowing needs, and domestic holdings of sovereign debt. 23 Nonetheless, it is noteworthy the fact that for the periods of high volatility in the economy (i.e. year before default and previous period before default) the trade-off between fitting the spreads or the debt-to-output ratio of the emerging economy is less acute for any of the versions of the model with risk averse investors than for the model with risk neutral investors. Second, the model with risk averse investors predicts lower overall levels of volatility for the trade balance than the model with risk neutral investors. However, on the plus side, the model delivers the correct timing for this volatility: while the model with risk neutral investors has the volatility falling for the year previous to default, all the versions of the model with risk averse investors have the volatility increasing for the year previous to default. Table 3 helps to understand the effects of some parameters on the equilibrium of the model. This table shows the results of the model with γ L fixed to 2, and y fixed to 0.969, with β L and X varying, and allowing for stochastic shocks to these two previous parameters (β L (S),X(S)) to r f (r f (S)), and to the preferences of the investors v(·)(S).
Sensitivity of the results
The effects of β L are as follows: lower levels of β L generate a higher average spread and a lower default probability, implying a higher average risk premium. However, the spreads and their volatility for the more volatile periods (year before default and period previous to default) decrease when β L decreases. Also the level of debt that can be supported at equilibrium is lower with lower levels of β L . Finally, the correlation between W and the variables of the economy is smaller when β L is lower.
If β L is stochastic then the spreads and their volatility in the more turbulent periods increase; also the correlation between W and the variables of the economy increases for these turbulent periods. 24 The effects of X on the equilibrium are as follow: higher X reduce the average spreads, the volatility of spreads, and the debt-to-output ratio in equilibrium, and reduce the correlation between W and the variables of the economy.
Again, if X is stochastic then the spreads and their volatility in the more turbulent periods increase. Also the model can replicate better the volatility of W , however the correlation between W and the variables of the economy does not change much (in relation to the model with X = 0.1). 25 When r f is stochastic, shocks to r f are common shocks to the economy and the investors. 24 The process for β L is simulated by a Markov perfect chain with 5 states. The mean value of β L is 0.965, the variance corresponds to 0.2775%, and the autocorrelation is set to 0.8501. The calibration for β L corresponds to the calibration of the process for the cycle of the US discount interest rate for the period 1983-2001, using that variable as a proxy for β L considering the existence at equilibrium of a tight link between international interest rates and β L . 25 The process for X is simulated by a Markov perfect chain with 5 states. The mean value of X is 0.425, the variance corresponds to 11.44%, and the autocorrelation is set to 0.5725. The calibration for X corresponds to the calibration of the process of the cycle of the Dow index for the period 1983-2001. The Dow index is used as a proxy for X considering that X represents other income to the investors not derived from T-Bills or bonds of the emerging economy.
In this version of the model, the spreads of the economy and their volatility are lower than in the model with a deterministic r f . On the other hand, the debt-to-output ratio increases despite the fact that the probability of default increases. When r f is stochastic the correlation between W and the variables of the emerging economy is somewhat higher than when r f is deterministic. 26 Finally, when multiplicative shocks to the investors utility function are considered, the effects on the spreads and their volatility are similar to the effects of shocks to X. However in this case, the correlation between W and the variables of the economy is relatively larger than in the model without these shocks. 27 In general, the results of the model appear relatively robust to changes in the parameters of the utility function of the investors or their budget constraint. Therefore, the contribution of the paper is twofold. First, the paper qualitatively and quantitatively characterizes the role of investors' characteristics in the determination of 26 The process for r f is simulated by a Markov perfect chain with 5 states. The mean value of r f is 1.7%, the variance corresponds to 0.165% and the autocorrelation is set to 0.9125. The calibration for r f corresponds to the calibration of the process for the cycle of 3-month T-Bills rates for the period 1983-2001. 27 The process for the multiplicative shocks to v(·) is simulated by a Markov perfect chain with 5 states. The mean value for the shock is 1, the variance corresponds to 8.92% and the autocorrelation is set to 0.6221. The calibration for these shocks corresponds to the calibration of the process of the cycle of the VIX (volatility index) for the period 1990-2001, using that variable as a proxy for the changes in the tolerance to risk of the investors and considering that the shocks to the utility function of the investors will modify their ability to take risk. small open economies' optimal plans when international credit contracts cannot be enforced. Second, the paper presents a theoretical framework that is extended in a companion paper (Lizarazo (2012) ) to a multi-country setup to study endogenous financial links across countries with common investors. This extension can endogenously explain the occurrence of contagion in sovereign debt markets of emerging economies. Quantitatively, the model developed here outperforms previous models of endogenous default risk in several ways. Compared to risk-neutral models using the same parameterizations, the current model performs better at jointly explaining sovereign spread levels and equilibrium debt levels. In comparison to those models with risk neutral investors, the present model supports a combination of higher levels of debt at equilibrium (at least for the more volatile periods of the economy) and higher and more volatile spreads. The model is also able to replicate the counter-cyclical behavior of domestic interest rates and the trade balance. Finally, the model is consistent with the observed negative correlation between measures of investors performance and interest rate spreads: this model exhibits the expected negative correlation between investors' wealth and sovereign spreads.
Conclusion
While the model improves on explaining the behavior of prices and quantities with respect to models of the same type that do not consider investors' characteristics, the model is not without shortcomings. For example, if γ L = 2 the maximum level of debt supported at equilibrium is only around 7.21% of the output, which is much lower than the 53.3% average reached by Argentina at the verge of default reported in Reinhart et al.(2003) .
Also, from a computational perspective, the inclusion of an additional state variable (the level of wealth of the investors) makes solving this problem much more intensive than the simpler model.
Nonetheless the model presented here opens the door to an important economic issuethat the creditworthiness of a country can be partially explained by factors other than the country's own fundamentals. Specifically, the consideration of risk averse investors explains a large part of sovereign bond spreads and the behavior of borrowers and investors in emerging markets.
Appendix 1: Proofs.
The proofs assume permanent exclusion of credit markets after a default, therefore the value function of default is independent of γ L , and W . The quantitative analysis of the model generalizes the results to the case of temporary exclusion. We focus on the case in which the investor is investing in bonds of the economy so θ ′ = −b ′ > 0. More borrowing implies a more negative b ′ .
Proof. Considering the case in which the government has not defaulted and assuming an interior solution for the allocation to the emerging economy's asset the first order condition of the investor's problem is
Because v(·) is of the CRRA type and γ L 1 < γ L 2 , then there exists a concave function ψ (·) such that v 2 c; γ L 2 = ψ v 1 c; γ L 2 . If ϑ ′ 1 is the optimal allocation when γ L = γ L 1 , and ϑ ′ 2 is the optimal allocation when γ L = γ L 2 then it holds that Using v 2 c; γ L 2 = ψ v 1 c; γ L 2 it is possible to define
, Υ(ϑ ′ ) > 0 and Υ ′ (ϑ ′ ) < 0. 28 28 The derivative of Υ(ϑ ′ ) is given by
< 0.
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The last inequality comes from the fact that both Υ(ϑ ′ ) and ψ ′ (ϑ ′ ) are positive and decreasing. The inclusion of these functions in the previous equation implies that φ 2 (ϑ ′ 1 ) is lower than φ 2 (ϑ ′ 2 ) because Υ ′ (ϑ ′ ) and ψ ′ (ϑ ′ ) give little weight to the realizations of d ′ = 1, and high weight to the realizations of d ′ = 0. 29 Therefore φ 2 (ϑ ′ 2 ) > φ 2 (ϑ ′ 1 ) .
The concavity of V L (·) implies that given q and the risk of default (represented by the expected realizations of d ′ , corresponding to the default probability δ) φ (ϑ ′ ) is a decreasing function, and as consequence ϑ ′ 2 < ϑ ′ 1 which in equilibrium implies b ′ 2 > b ′ 1 .
Then for any s and taking as given q and δ, a higher γ L would result in this agent allocating a lower proportion of her portfolio to the economy's sovereign bonds. Therefore, when the investor is less risk averse there are financial contracts that are available to the emerging economy that are not available when the investor is more risk averse. Consequently, given q and δ then V C
Because the utility of autarky for the emerging economy does not depend on γ L , it is clear that if for some s, default is optimal when γ L = γ L 1 , then for the same s default would be optimal when γ L = γ L 2 . Additionally, because incentives to default would be higher whenever γ L = γ L 2 , than when γ L = γ L 1 at equilibrium δ s, b ′ ; γ L 2 > δ s, b ′ ; γ L 1 , and therefore q s, b ′ ; γ L 2 < q s, b ′ ; γ L 1 .
Proposition 2 Default sets are shrinking in assets of the representative investor. For all W 1 < W 2 , if default is optimal for b in some states y, given W 2 , then default will be optimal for b for the same states y, given W 1 . Therefore D (b | W 2 ) ⊆ D (b | W 1 )
Proof. Because v(·) exhibits DARA v (W 1 , ϑ ′ ) is a concave transformation of v (W 2 , ϑ ′ ) so if ϑ ′ 1 is the optimal allocation when W = W 1 , and ϑ ′ 2 is the optimal allocation when W = W 2 , it is possible to define v 1 (ϑ ′ 1 ) = v (W 1 , ϑ ′ 1 ) and v 2 (ϑ ′ 2 ) = v (W 2 , ϑ ′ 2 ), where v 1 (ϑ ′ ) = ψ (v 2 (ϑ ′ )). The first order conditions of the investor are 29 From the problem when γ L = γ L 1 we know that E {−qv1,c (cL (ϑ ′ 1 )) + βv1,c (c ′ L (ϑ ′ 1 )) d ′ } = 0. But since ψ ′ (ϑ ′ ) is positive and decreasing then it weights the realizations of d ′ = 0 more than the realizations of d ′ = 1 and Eψ ′ [v1 (cL(ϑ ′ 1 ))] {−qv1,c (cL (ϑ ′ 1 )) + βv1,c (c ′ L (ϑ ′ 1 )) d ′ } < 0. Also since Υ ′ (ϑ ′ ) is positive and decreasing this function also weights the realizations of d ′ = 0 more than the realizations of d ′ = 1, and E {−qv1,c (cL (ϑ ′ 1 )) + βΥ(ϑ ′ 1 )v1,c (c ′ L (ϑ ′ 1 )) d ′ } < 0. Combining these results we have φ2 (ϑ ′ 1 ) < 0.
solve the problem of the investor to find her value function V L(i) (s) and her optimal policy functions W ′ * ,(i) (s).
(iii) Solve the problem of the government to find its value function V (i) (s), its optimal policy functions b ′ * ,(i) (s) , and d * ,(i) (s) and the new equilibrium price function q EE(i) s; b ′(i) (s) . This maximization involves the following sub-steps:
(a) Take q AP C,(−i) (s) and W ′ * ,(i) (s) as given to compute c that is derived from (17): 
